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Ph.D., Psychology, University of New Mexico, 2015
ABSTRACT
The primary goal of this study was to investigating the extent to which young
preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) understand identity in terms of what an object does rather
than in terms of either what the object looks like or what its inside properties are. My
primary guiding research questions are on what basis do preschoolers construct identity
judgments. Unlike previous research, which has focused primarily on one pair of qualities
(insides/outsides), this study includes diverse pairs in order to investigate different
levels/qualities of organization that characterize preschoolers’ judgments of identity
constancy. I predicted that a transition may occur between the ages of 3- and 5-years-old:
a shift from a focus on behavior/action to a focus on insides as foundational to identity
judgments. One hundred and seventy-four 3- and 5-year-olds recruited through 11 area
preschools participated in one out of 3 phases of testing session. This study was able to
access the organization structure and developmental patterns in preschoolers’ identity
judgments under two analytic strategies: independent phase analysis and across phase
analysis. The results suggest that 3- and 5-years-old do not seem to consider
behavior/action as central to identity in a causal paradigm. I failed to replicate Sobel et al.
(2007) in the context of Phase 1, and I found alternative developmental pathways in
terms of consistency in preschoolers responding. Five-year-olds show consistency in their
responding, but this consistency is not in one direction (e.g., essentialist thoughts) as
Sobel et al. suggested. The results also point to the possibility that younger preschoolers
(e.g., 3-year-olds) are still in a transition period. Further research is needed to investigate
which developmental patterns are more legitimate as a representation of preschoolers’
identity judgments. Sobel et al’s study, in its original methodology, needs to be replicated
with more economically and educationally diverse samples as these two factors seem
play a role.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... vi
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1
The Current Study ................................................................................................. 12
METHOD ........................................................................................................................ 13
Participants ............................................................................................................ 13
Phase 1. ..................................................................................................... 13
Phase 2. ..................................................................................................... 14
Phase 3. ..................................................................................................... 16
General Procedure ................................................................................................. 18
Design and Materials ............................................................................................ 18
Warm Up ............................................................................................................... 19
Phase 1: Insides vs. Outsides ................................................................................ 19
Phase 2: Outsides vs. Action ................................................................................. 22
Phase 3: Insides vs. Action ................................................................................... 24
Data Collection, Training, Quality Control, Data Coding and Prediction ............ 27
RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 30
Preliminary Analyses ............................................................................................ 30
Plan for Main Analyses ......................................................................................... 31
Independent Phase Analyses: Insides vs. Outsides (Phase 1) ............................... 34
Independent Phase Analyses: Outsides vs. Action (Phase 2) ............................... 36
Independent Phase Analyses: Insides vs. Action (Phase 3) .................................. 37
Across Phase Analyses ......................................................................................... 38
Across Phase Analyses: Internal vs. Non-internal Causal Condition (Phase 1 and
Phase 3) ................................................................................................................. 38
Across Phase Analyses: External vs. Non-external Causal Condition (Phase 1 and
Phase 2) ................................................................................................................. 40
Across Phase Analyses: Behavioral/action vs. Non-behavioral/action Causal
Condition (Phase 2 and Phase 3) .......................................................................... 42
DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................. 44
iv

Limitations and Future Directions ........................................................................ 52
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 54
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 55

v

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. An example of stimuli from Phase 1 and Phase 2. ............................................ 21
Figure 2. A sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 1. ................ 22
Figure 3. A sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 2.. ............... 24
Figure 4. An example of stimuli from Phase 3.. ............................................................... 25
Figure 5. A sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 3.. ............... 27

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 1 .............................................. 14
Table 2. Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 2 .............................................. 15
Table 3. Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 3 .............................................. 17
Table 4. Summary of Number of Participants Making Internal Causal Responses Based
on Condition...................................................................................................................... 32
Table 5. Summary of Number of Participants Making External Causal Responses Based
on Condition...................................................................................................................... 33
Table 6. Summary of Number of Participants Making Behavior/action Causal Responses
Based on Condition ........................................................................................................... 33
Table 7. Summary of Number of Participants Making Internal Causal Responses Based
on Age ............................................................................................................................... 40
Table 8. Summary of Number of Participants Making External Causal Responses Based
on Age ............................................................................................................................... 42
Table 9. Summary of Number of Participants Making Behavioral/action Causal
Responses Based on Age .................................................................................................. 44

vii

The Development of Identity in Preschoolers
Understanding that things in the world maintain their identity despite changes in
their appearance has long been considered a benchmark for children’s cognitive
development (De Vries, 1969; Piaget, 1968). From knowing that your father remains
your father despite his looking like a Goblin when dressed up for Halloween; to knowing
that a cat remains a member of the cat category despite being altered in appearance to
look like a dog; to knowing that a quantity of water remains the same quantity despite
being transferred to a taller, thinner container—all of these forms of understanding
involve the construction of conceptual invariants of varying degrees of complexity. Early
childhood marks a key developmental period of emergence for conceptual invariants, but
both their nature and developmental course remain ongoing points of contention in the
developmental literature.
In Piaget’s (1954, 1968) theory of early childhood cognitive development, the
emergence of object permanence in infancy actually engenders the first conceptual
invariant of identity: existence. By the end of the infancy period, the young child can
maintain the constancy of an object’s existence despite a change in its perceptual
availability to the child. This qualitative invariant ushers in the early childhood period
and is later followed by the emergence of other qualitative conceptual invariants, such as
an understanding of constancy in individual and generic identity in which children
maintain the sameness of an individual as an individual or as a member of a class of
individuals despite a transformation in appearance (De Vries, 1969). Piaget (1968)
explicitly contrasted these qualitative invariants of identity understanding with the
quantitative invariants (e.g., height, width, length, liquid quantity) that classically form
1

children’s notions of conservation (i.e., knowing that water transferred from a small, wide
container to a taller, thinner container still comprises the same amount of water, even
though it looks like there is more water in the taller, thinner container). Quantitative
invariants of conservation, according to Piaget (1947), don’t emerge until the end of early
childhood, by 6 to 7 years. Whereas qualitative invariants of identity understanding
require nothing more than the dissociation of permanent from variable qualities,
quantitative invariants of conservation require higher-order, operative processes such as
reversibility and transitivity (Piaget, 1947, 1968).
Thus, Piaget argued that, developmentally, the concept of identity comes before
that of conservation:
The essential characteristic of preoperational (that is, preconservational)
identity…is that it deals with simple qualitative invariants, without any
quantitative composition. For example, in the pouring of liquids, even a 4 or 5
year old, who maintains that the amount of water has changed, will admit that it is
‘the same water,’ in the sense that the nature of the matter ‘water’ has not changed
even if the quantity of that matter has changed. Similarly, if he draws his own
body as he was when he was little and again as he is now, he will recognize that it
is still the same individual, even if he is bigger in size (‘It’s still me’). (1968, p. 19)
Classic work by De Vries (1969) on preschoolers’ construction of invariance in
understanding of generic identity confirmed this developmental sequence. In De Vries’
study, preschoolers were first familiarized with a cat and then presented with the same cat
wearing either a dog or rabbit mask. Three-year-olds treated the cat now wearing a mask
as something frightening and acted as though the cat had transformed into a monster,
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believing that its identity had changed with the appearance change. The persistent failure
of 3-year-olds to maintain the cat’s identity as a cat across this transformation in
appearance, however, was replaced by 5 years of age with an understanding that the cat
remained a cat even though it looked like a dog or rabbit. Thus, DeVries demonstrated
that preschoolers by 5 years had already acquired qualitative invariants of identity, even
though these same 5-year-olds failed on conservation tasks involving quantitative
invariants.
Piaget’s (1968) acknowledgement of a “preoperational notion” (p. 30) of identity
developing well in advance of the emergence of conservation skills has been largely
ignored in modern research on the development of identity understanding. In fact,
modern research on children’s understanding of identity routinely presents Piaget as
having suggested that children fail to establish conceptual invariants of identity (both
individual and generic, or kind identity) until they first show consistent signs of
developing quantitative invariants in the form of conservation skills, typically at the end
of the early childhood period. By conflating qualitative (identity) and quantitative
(conservation) invariants, modern research has argued that Piaget viewed the preschooler
throughout the early childhood period as an “externalist” with respect to the notion of
identity. In other words, researchers over the last couple of decades have charged that
Piaget believed children before the ages of 6 to 7 to be bound to surface-level, variable,
appearance properties of objects, meaning that they fail to understand identity constancy
at all during early childhood (e.g., Gelman, 2000, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 1991;
Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996).
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With this mischaracterization of Piaget in place, a growing body of literature has
emerged demonstrating preschoolers’ precocious understanding of the “non-obvious,” the
hidden layers of underlying invariance that order the surface world of appearances
(Gelman, 2000, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Gutheil,
Gelman, Klein, Michos, & Kelaita, 2008; Newman & Keil, 2008; Waxman, Medin, &
Ross, 2007). This work has promoted the view of preschoolers as essentialists, already
endowed in early childhood with a mature core of domain-specific conceptual invariants
for organizing the world and their experience of it on the basis of underlying,
unobservable realities, or essences (Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Keil, 1992; Newman &
Keil, 2008; Simons & Keil, 1995). Psychological essentialism entails an implicit, naïve
belief in some internal, underlying property or quality—an essence—that makes an object
what it is, both as a unique individual and as a member of a kind (Gelman, 2000, 2003,
2004; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Most readily applied to living kinds but also extendable to
all natural kinds as well as artifacts, this naïve belief construes an essence in causal terms:
essences are a level of reality that underlies and determines the observable level of
appearance. Developmental investigations of the extent to which an essentialist bias is
already evident in the thinking of young children have generally relied on evidence from
three key empirical paradigms—transformation/transplant, adoption, and causal
explanation paradigms—all designed to index critical properties of essentialist thought
(Gelman, 2003).
Transformation/transplant paradigms target preschoolers’ belief in maintenance
of individual and kind identity despite a transformation of the organism’s external
appearance (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gottfried, Gelman, & Schultz, 1999;
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Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996). Adoption paradigms also target preschoolers’ belief in
identity maintenance across a change, but for these paradigms, the change derives from
the external circumstances surrounding an organism’s upbringing—e.g. a baby cat is
adopted by a family of dogs—and captures the extent to which preschoolers privilege
essential nature over external nurture in the establishment of individual and kind identity
(e.g., Atran et al., 2001; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007).
Finally, causal explanation paradigms target preschoolers’ belief in the causal
significance of properties endogenous to an organism (or artifact) for what the organism
(or artifact) does: its behavior, activity, and causal impact on the world (e.g., Gelman &
Gottfried, 1996; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, Meltzoff, &
Blumenthal, 2007). When one looks across these paradigms at the extent to which
preschoolers 1) maintain an object’s identity and kind membership despite observable
changes in the object’s appearance or external circumstances and 2) appeal to something
beyond that which is immediately observable as the causal basis for what the object is, a
solid empirical foundation for claims of an essentialist bias or stance in preschoolers is
evident in children as young as 4 to 5 years. Taken together, transformation/transplant,
adoption, and causal explanation paradigms provide persuasive evidence for at least the
rudiments of an essentialist stance during the preschool years, seen specifically in 4- to 5year-olds’ preservation of individual and kind identity across transformations in external
appearance, decidedly nativist leanings in predicting an organism’s developmental
outcome, and appeals to unobservable, endogenous factors when explaining an
organism’s causal properties (Gelman, 2000, 2003).
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Many researchers have also argued that some form of an essentialist stance is
already in place at the start of the early childhood period, at least by age 2 (e.g., Gelman,
2003, 2004). By this view, preschoolers throughout the early childhood period construct
conceptual invariants of identity by penetrating beneath the surface of the observable.
However, evidence in favor of some degree of psychological essentialism as early as 2
years is inconsistent and subject to interpretational debate, raising the possibility, in turn,
that young preschoolers may order their worlds in effectively non-essentialist ways.
Studies involving both adoption and causal explanation paradigms, for example,
have yielded no evidence of an essentialist stance in children before the age of 4. In one
of the few adoption paradigm studies to employ populations younger than 4 years,
Hirschfeld and Gelman (1997) reported chance level responding for 3-year-olds, in
marked contrast to the consistent nativist stance of the 5-year-olds in their sample. 3year-olds, in other words, unlike 5-year-olds, were as likely to claim that a pig raised with
cows would act like a cow as they were to claim that the pig would act like a pig. In the
context of causal explanation paradigms, evidence against an essentialist stance in 3-yearolds is even stronger. Specifically with respect to Sobel et al.’s (2007) paradigm,
researchers presented children with various objects that activated a machine when
brought in contact with the machine and then asked the children to identify another
object—from among objects that were either externally or internally-similar to the target
object—which would be likely to produce the same consequence. Preschoolers as young
as 4 years picked objects which had similar insides to the target object that activated the
machine, suggesting that by this age children tie an object’s causal properties to its
insides or internal structure and privilege these insides over the object’s external
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appearance when predicting what an object does. 3-year-olds, however, appealed
significantly more often to outward appearance than to internal properties and identified
similar looking objects (at the level of outward appearance) as those most likely to
activate the machine. In other words, 3-year-olds showed an externalist bias in their
responding (Sobel et al., 2007).
To the extent that evidence exists in support of 3-year-olds’ looking beyond
appearance to deep, hidden regularities, the evidence is decidedly mixed and often
fraught with interpretation problems. For every result demonstrating young preschoolers’
move beyond appearance there exists a result demonstrating their firm entrenchment in
appearance. Gelman and Wellman (1991), for example, showed that 3-year-olds rely on
category information over appearance when making predictions about the insides of an
object (e.g., judging that a lemon, in contrast to an orange balloon, is more likely to have
the same kind of insides as an orange); the authors suggested that by age 3, children
distinguish insides from outsides and attune to non-obvious internal properties as
establishing commonality among members of a kind even in the face of conflicting
surface appearance. However, Peskin and Olson (2001) showed that 3-year-olds actively
struggle with predictions of behavior when faced with an organism that is dressed up as
another such that their appearance conflicts with their real identity (e.g., a cat wearing a
sheep suit); under these circumstances, 3- but not 5-year-olds appealed to how the
organism looked when predicting its behavior, even to the point of suggesting that a dog
wearing a bird costume could fly.
Perhaps the most consistent evidence in favor of young preschoolers’ essentialist
stance comes from work on inductive inference in preschoolers (Gelman, 2003). In this

7

work, preschoolers are presented with the picture of a natural kind member, either living
or nonliving (e.g., a squirrel, yellow tulip, sugar cube), provided with a label to denote
category membership (e.g., this is a squirrel), and given specific information about this
target member, ranging from internal part information to behavioral and origin
information (e.g., it has eggs inside, eats bugs, comes from the sea). Preschoolers are then
presented with the picture of a different but similar-looking natural kind and one of the
same natural kind but dissimilar-looking—category membership via labeling for both
being established—and asked whether each of the new objects has the properties of the
original target object. Under these circumstances, children throughout the early childhood
period—and even extending earlier into infancy—reliably generalize nonobvious
properties to perceptually-dissimilar members of the same category, not to similar
looking members of another category, suggesting that category membership, not
similarity of appearance, drives inductive generalization (Gelman & Coley, 1990;
Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Welder & Graham, 2001).
This interpretation of preschoolers’ inductive generalization has come under fire,
however, given its erroneous conflation of labels with category membership. Sloutsky
and colleagues (e.g., Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Sloutsky, Kloos,
& Fisher, 2007) have invoked Piaget’s (1929) notion of nominal realism to suggest that,
for preschoolers, labels constitute featural, indispensable properties of objects and
consequently are foundational to the perceptual similarity of objects, rather than serving
as conceptual indices of categorical membership. In fact, converging evidence targeting
the mechanisms underlying young children’s inductive generalization and controlling for
conflation of label and category membership points to appearance similarity rather than
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category membership as the basis for preschoolers’ inductive generalizations (Sloutsky et
al., 2007), with inductions based on category knowledge emerging gradually between
early and middle childhood (Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004).
Thus, unlike studies of psychological essentialism with 4- to 5-year-olds, those
that target younger ages have demonstrated little to no systematic evidence in favor of an
essentialist bias. What, then, is the nature of children’s understanding of identity before 4
years? What potentially unique organizational qualities might characterize preschoolers’
judgments of identity when they are 3 years old? In the literature on psychological
essentialism, children’s development of identity constancy is routinely framed in either/or
terms. Either the child appreciates constancy of identity across an outward transformation
and thinks as an essentialist, or she/he fails to do so and therefore is an externalist,
focused only on appearance without understanding the invariance of identity despite an
appearance change. Either the preschooler is an externalist, pre-conceptually bound to
the surface, variable, ephemeral world of appearance, or the preschooler is an essentialist,
conceptually looking beneath the surface of variability to extract underlying invariants.
Such framing establishes the development of identity constancy as a shift from an
absence to a presence in the repertoire of the child. However, a more developmentallyappropriate question is not whether preschoolers judge identity to be constant but on what
basis do they construct identity judgments of constancy and how does this basis change
across development (Mohr, 1978). This reframes the developmental question of
conceptual qualitative invariants to involve an investigation of the different levels of
organization that reliably characterize preschoolers’ judgments of identity constancy.
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What, then, is the nature of the qualitative invariants to which young preschoolers
appeal in their identity judgments prior to the emergence of an essentialist stance at 4 to 5
years? Piagetian-inspired work on children’s construal of self-identity suggests a
potential answer. When asked to describe themselves, 3- to 5-year-olds reliably respond
in terms of the activities they can and do perform, prompting Keller, Ford, and Meacham
(1978) to assert that “activity is indeed the most salient dimension of the self-concepts of
preschool children” (p. 488). Extending work by Guardo and Bohan (1971), Mohr (1978)
targeted older children’s reflective understanding of identity invariance by asking 6, 8,
and 11-year-olds to explicitly address what sorts of hypothetical transformations would
be required to alter the nature of their personal identity (e.g., children were asked “What
would you have to change about yourself for you to become your best friend?”). Across
middle childhood, a standard developmental trend emerged that consisted of decreasing
appeal to external, physical characteristic-based transformations and an increasing appeal
to internal, psychological transformations. However, Mohr’s study additionally revealed
a middle level consisting of children’s predominant reliance on behavioral
transformations as foundational to identity change; in Mohr’s words, “behavior-based
categories (of personal identity) are a developmental predecessor to internal categories”
(p. 428). This work suggests that an understanding of constancy in an organism’s identity
in terms of regularities in how the organism acts may serve as the developmental
foundation out of which an essentialist understanding of identity grows.
Could a similar sequence—from behavior or activity-based judgments to internal
or essence-based judgments—mark the development of preschoolers’ pre-reflective
notions of identity in early childhood? That is, consistent with Piagetian thought, could
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the constancy of something’s identity first exist for the young preschooler in the
patterning of its activity, in what it does—a dynamic activity of becoming, not a static
condition of being—before becoming differentiated from that activity and reified as a
causal antecedent for that activity in the form of an essentialist stance? Work on
preschoolers’ essentialist bias largely treats an organism’s (or object’s) activity as an
outcome or dependent variable; preschoolers are commonly asked to predict what will
happen to an organism’s functioning after a transformation to either the organism’s
external appearance or to its internal properties. To the extent that an organism’s activity
itself is manipulated as an independent variable in these studies, such a manipulation
commonly accompanies that of an organism’s external, appearance characteristics,
resulting in a conflation of external appearance—how an organism looks—and the
activity it performs—what is does. Yet Shipley (2000) has critically documented that 3and 5-year-olds, when asked to explain to an “alien” puppet what various organisms on
earth are, rely far more on what the organism does—on its behavior—than on how it
looks in their explanations.
In fact, Shipley (2000) demonstrated that 3- and 4-year-olds privilege the
behavior of an animal over both its insides and its outer appearance in their determination
of the animal’s identity. Preschoolers in her study were presented with descriptions of
animals made by a traveling puppet; in these descriptions, the puppet reported on animals
that acted like a certain kind of animal (e.g., “it eats meat like a tiger and roars like a
tiger”) but had either the insides of another animal (e.g., “but it has the brain and lungs of
a camel”) or looked like another animal (e.g., “but it has humps on its back and a long
neck like a camel”). Preschoolers, faced with these conflicting reports, were asked to
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establish the identity of the animal (e.g., “is it a tiger or a camel?”). For a majority of both
3- and 4-year-olds, behavior outweighed both appearance and insides in their judgments
of animal identity, demonstrating the salience of an organism’s activity in young
preschoolers’ notions of identity.
Recent work on the spontaneous, self-generated narratives of preschoolers further
substantiates the developmental precedence of activity-based judgments relative to
internal/essence-based judgments in early childhood. Nicolopoulou and Richner (2007)
investigated the nature of character representation in the naturalistic story-telling of 3- to
5-year-olds and found support for reorganizational change in how preschoolers portrayed
the characters in their stories. Whereas 4- and 5-year-olds constructed agentive and
mentalistic characters with basic psychological or “internal” properties like intentions,
desires, and beliefs, 3-year-olds employed nonpsychological characters, describable
predominantly in terms of the actions they performed. What Nicolopoulou and Richner
identified as a “developmental shift in character representation from actors to agents to
persons” (p. 423) dovetails with a potential transition between 3 and 5 years in
preschoolers’ construal of identity from activity-based to increasingly essentialist-based.
The Current Study
The current study is designed to investigate the extent to which young
preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) understand identity in terms of what an object does rather
than in terms of either what the object looks like or what its inside properties are.
Specifically, I have taken Sobel et al.’s (2007) paradigm and modified it to include
manipulations not just of how objects look and of what insides the objects have but also
of how objects act to see whether younger preschoolers use the actions of an object to
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predict the extent to which that object will activate a machine when placed on the
machine. I am interested in examining whether 5-year-olds rely on insides in their
identity judgments whereas 3-year-olds conversely rely on external appearance or an
object’s act and would choose behavioral/action over external appearance when offered
the choice. Therefore, I suggest that a transition may occur between the ages of 3- and 5years-old: a shift from a focus on behavior/action to a focus on insides as foundational to
identity judgments.
Method
Participants
This study focused on 3- and 5-years-old preschoolers. A total of 174 participants
were recruited through 11 area preschools in Albuquerque, NM. There were a total of
three phases in this study. Participants were recruited and randomly assigned to complete
one of the three phases. Sample characteristics for each phase are as follows:
Phase 1. The participants were fifty-six 3- and 5-year-olds: twenty-six 3-yearolds (15 boys, 11 girls, Mage=41.96 months, SD=3.8 months), and thirty 5-year-olds (19
boys, 11 girls, Mage=63.37 months, SD=3.5 months). There were no differences in the
mean age of boys and girls in any age group. The Phase 1 sample was recruited from 6
different preschools and was ethnically diverse, with 54% European American, 23%
Hispanic American, and 23% unspecified. Participants were predominantly working and
middle class (9% below the poverty level, 21% 20-50K, 21% 50-80K, 43% greater than
80K, 5% Other). Of the parents, 13% had completed high school, 25% had earned a
bachelor’s degree, 27% had earned a master’s degree, and 34% had earned a doctoral
degree. Sample characteristics for those included in the analysis (n=56) are reported in
13

Table 1.
Table 1
Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 1
N (%)
Variable

3-year-olds

5-year-olds

Total

Boys

15 (57.7)

19 (63.3)

34(60.7)

Girls

11 (42.3)

11 (36.7)

22 (39.3)

European American

14 (53.8)

16 (53.3)

30 (53.6)

Hispanic American

5 (19.2)

8 (26.7)

13 (23.2)

Other*

7 (26.9)

6 (20.0)

13 (23.2)

Less than $20,000

3 (11.5)

2 (7.4)

5 (9.4)

$20,000 - $ 50,000
$50,000 - $ 80,000

6 (23.1)
2 (7.7)

6 (22.2)
10 (37.0)

12 (22.6)
12 (22.6)

Greater than $80,000

15 (57.7)

9 (33.3)

24 (45.3)

High school

2 (7.7)

5 (17.2)

7 (12.7)

Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree

8 (30.8)
7 (26.9)

6 (20.7)
8 (27.6)

14 (25.5)
15 (27.3)

Doctoral degree

9 (34.6)

10 (34.5)

19 (34.5)

Gender

Race and ethnicity

Household income

Parents education

Note. * Parent choose not to reveal child’s race and ethnicity

Phase 2. The participants were sixty-one 3- and 5-year-olds: thirty-one 3-yearolds (21 boys, 10 girls, Mage=43.99 months, SD=4.3 months), and thirty 5-year-olds (16
boys, 14 girls, Mage=63.37 months, SD=4.9 months). There were no differences in the
mean age of boys and girls in any age group. The Phase 2 sample was recruited from 5
different preschools and was ethnically diverse, with 61% European American, 18%
Hispanic American, 5% Native American, 2% Asian American, 2% African American,
14

and 12% Unspecified. Participants were predominantly working and middle class (11 %
below the poverty level, 20% 20-50K, 16% 50-80K, 50% greater than 80K, 3% Other).
Of the parents, 16 % had completed high school, 23% had earned a bachelor’s degree, 26 %
had earned a master’s degree, and 32 % had earned a doctoral degree. Sample
characteristics for those included in the analysis (n=61) are reported in Table 2.
Table 2
Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 2
N (%)
Variable

3-years-olds

5-years-olds

Total

Boys

21 (67.7)

16 (53.3)

37(60.7)

Girls

10 (32.3)

14 (46.7)

24 (39.3)

19 (65.5)

18 (62.1)

37 (63.8)

Hispanic American

6 (20.7)

5 (17.2)

11 (19.0)

Native American

0 (0.0)

3 (10.3)

3 (5.2)

Asian American

1 (3.4)

0 (0.0)

1 (1.7)

African American
Other*

1 (3.4)
2 (6.9)

0 (0.0)
3 (10.3)

1 (1.7)
5 (8.6)

Less than $20,000

2 (6.7)

5 (17.2)

7 (11.9)

$20,000 - $ 50,000

6 (20.0)

6 (20.7)

12 (20.3)

$50,000 - $ 80,000

5 (16.7)

5 (17.2)

10 (16.9)

Greater than $80,000
Parents education

17 (56.7)

13 (44.8)

30 (50.8)

High school

2 (6.5)

8 (27.6)

10 (16.7)

Bachelor’s degree

6 (19.4)

8 (27.6)

14 (23.3)

Master’s degree

8 (25.8)

8 (27.6)

16 (26.7)

Doctoral degree

15 (48.4)

5 (17.2)

20 (33.3)

Gender

Race and ethnicity
European American

Household income

Note. * Parent choose not to reveal child’s race and ethnicity
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Phase 3. The participants were fifty-seven 3- and 5-year-olds: twenty-nine 3year-olds (12 boys, 17 girls, Mage=42.24 months, SD=4.5 months), and twenty-eight 5year-olds (13 boys, 15 girls, Mage=63.50 months, SD=4.1 months). There were no
differences in the mean age of boys and girls in any age group. The Phase 3 sample was
recruited from 9 different preschools and was ethnically diverse, with 30% European
American, 29% Hispanic American, 5% Native American, 2% Asian American, 4%
African American, and 30% Unspecified. Participants were predominantly working and
middle class (14 % below the poverty level, 21% 20-50K, 19% 50-80K, 44% greater than
80K, 2% Other). Of the parents, 25 % had completed high school, 25% had earned a
bachelor’s degree, 29 % had earned a master’s degree, and 21 % had earned a doctoral
degree. Sample characteristics for those included in the analysis (n=57) are reported in
Table 3.
Families with children ages 3 and 5 years received a letter explaining the study
and had the opportunity to sign a consent form. Thereafter they returned it to the
preschools along with a questionnaire asking basic demographic data, including the
child’s age, sex and ethnicity, parental education and income level. In addition, the
Principal Investigator recruited children ages 3 and 5 years at area preschools by being
available in the main lobby to provide interested parents information about the current
study.
Each phase in the current study was designed to be child friendly and to not place
too great of a task demand on the participants. If the participant was unwilling to
continue participation, a second attempt in completing testing of the participant would be
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made on the following day. Each participant received a toy upon completion of the phase
of the study in which they participated.
Table 3
Sample Characteristics of Participants in Phase 3
N (%)
Variable

3-years-olds

5-years-olds

Total

Boys

12 (41.4)

13 (46.4)

25(43.9)

Girls

17 (58.6)

15 (53.6)

32 (56.1)

12 (28.6)

6 (33.3)

17 (30.9)

Hispanic American

7 (39.3)

9 (22.2)

16 (30.9)

Native American

0 (0.0)

3 (11.1)

3 (5.5)

Asian American

1 (3.6)

1 (3.7)

2 (3.6)

African American
Other*

1 (3.6)
7 (25.0)

0 (0.0)
8 (29.6)

1 (1.8)
15 (27.3)

Less than $20,000

2 (7.1)

6 (21.4)

8 (14.3)

$20,000 - $ 50,000

6 (21.4)

6 (21.4)

12 (21.4)

$50,000 - $ 80,000

6 (21.4)

5 (17.9)

11 (19.6)

Greater than $80,000
Parents education

14 (50.0)

11 (39.3)

25 (44.6)

High school

2 (7.1)

12 (42.9)

14 (25.0)

Bachelor’s degree

9 (32.1)

5 (17.9)

14 (25.0)

Master’s degree

8 (28.6)

8 (28.6)

16 (28.6)

Doctoral degree

9 (32.1)

3 (10.7)

12 (21.4)

Gender

Race and ethnicity
European American

Household income

Note. * Parent choose not to reveal child’s race and ethnicity
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General Procedure
Once the parent or guardian gave consent for their child to participate in this study,
participants were asked to complete the phase of the study which was in accordance with
their consent forms. For each phase of the study, a preschool provider escorted the
participant to a quiet room of their preschool where the experimenters were waiting. The
participant was asked to sit at a table next to the experimenter and was tested individually.
After the initial introduction between the participant and the experimenter, the participant
was invited to play a laptop computer game with the experimenter. The participant was
told that he/she would see some blocks and would be asked some questions about the
blocks. Throughout the duration of each testing phase, the preschool provider remained
present in the room (seated behind the participant) and was instructed to refrain from
contributing in any way while the participant was performing the task.
Design and Materials
All phases of the study involved the presentation of an animation with a machine
and blocks (i.e., blue squares, pink ball, and red diamond, etc). Participants were asked to
reason about the causal properties of the blocks. The machine in the animation —
modeled after the “blicket” detector in Sobel et al. (2007) — was a box that lights up and
plays music when a block is placed on top it. A total of 27 blocks were involved in
different animations (9 blocks were used in each phase). The blocks varied on three
dimensions: 1) their insides, 2) their outsides, and 3) the action they perform. Specifically,
the blocks used in each phase either varied on whether they had a white pin in the center
of the block or not (insides), whether they had the same shape and color or not (outsides)
and whether they displayed the same or a different motion (action). Each phase involved
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three trials and each trial involved three blocks—a target object and two alternative
objects that differed on a particular property (e.g., insides, outsides or action) they shared
with the target object. Each of the three trials used in Phases 1, 2 and 3 began by having
participants presented with a target object that appeared to activate the machine when the
object was placed on the machine. Participants were then asked to decide which of two
alternative objects would also activate the machine. In Phase 1, the two alternative
objects differed on whether they shared the same insides or outsides with the target object.
In Phase 2, the two alternative objects differed on whether they shared the same outsides
or action with the target object. In Phase 3, the two alternative objects differed on
whether they shared the same insides or action with the target object. The presentation
order of the three trials within each phase was randomly determined across participants.
Warm up
At the beginning of each testing phase, participants were given a warm-up activity
to ensure that they could point to the objects and respond to the experimenter. In the
warm-up animation, participants were presented with four blocks of differing sizes and
colors (i.e., a small green triangle, a big yellow square, a mid-size blue square, a red
diamond) and were asked to point to the biggest one, then the red one, then the smallest
one, and lastly the blue one. If the participant failed to answer or responded incorrectly,
corrective feedback was given by the experimenter.
Phase 1: Insides vs. Outsides
Phase 1 focused on whether children privilege insides or outsides when asked to
make inferences about the causal property of objects and employed a methodology
modified after Sobel et al. (2007). At the beginning of the testing session, a machine and
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three blocks were presented in the animation on a laptop and the participants were told
that they were going to play a game with a very special machine. The nine blocks used in
phase 1 were divided into three sets of three blocks (see Figure 1). In each set of three
blocks, one object was the target object that was a certain shape and color (e.g., square
and blue) and had something inside it (e.g., had a white pin inserted into a hole that was
covered by a dowel inserted into the hole, hiding the contents of the hole). The next
object (alternative object A) shared the same outsides, shape and color, as the target
object (e.g., square and blue) but differed on the insides (e.g., did not have a white pin
inserted into a hole). The last object (alternative object B) shared the same insides as the
target object (e.g., had a white pin that was inserted into the hole) but differed from the
target object in terms of its outsides, shape and color (e.g., triangle and yellow).
In the animation (see Figure 2), participants were shown each of the objects and
were shown the dowel inserted into each of the objects and the contents of the hole.
Specifically, the animation showed a hand removing the dowel of each object, with the
experimenter labeling the outsides of the object and the insides of the object for the
participant. For example, the experimenter played the animation, and when the hand in
the animation selected the first object, the experimenter said, “This one is blue and it has
a little white thing inside.” Then the animation showed the participant the second object
and the experimenter said, “This one is empty and it is blue.” Finally the animation
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Figure 1. An example of stimuli from Phase 1 and 2. Each row represents a set of objects
for a trial. In each trial, the target object is the object in the center. The two alternative
objects are on both sides. There are two versions (A vs. B) for each set of objects for each
trial. The outside similar alternative object is on the left side of the target object in the A
version of stimuli set. The outside similar alternative object is on the right side of the
target object in the B version of stimuli set. The trials and versions of stimuli sets
presented in each phase are randomly assigned to each participant.

showed the child the third object and experimenter said, “This one is yellow and it has a
little white thing inside.” After the insides were shown to the participant, the animation
featured a hand putting the dowels back in place so that the insides were no longer visible.
The above scene sequence was repeated with the experimenter saying, “Let’s look at
them again.” Then, the animation showed the hand selecting the target object and placing
it on the machine, which caused the machine to light up and play music. Following the
animation, the experimenter said, “Look at that, it makes the machine light up and play
music!” The experimenter then would ask, “Can you point to another one that can make
the machine light up and play music?” Participants were not given any feedback on their
answers. Once a participant pointed to the object he/she thought could make the machine
light up and play music, the experimenter would then ask the participant, “Why did you
pick that one?” to investigate the reasoning the child offered for his/her choice of a
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particular object (alternative object A or alternative object B). Once the participant
answered the question or stated he/she did not have an answer to the question, the next
trial would start, using three new objects. The procedure continued until the participant
completed the three trials (presented in random order across participants) or indicated
she/he no longer wanted to participate.

Figure 2. This is a sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 1. Each
scene represents a moment in the animation. (0) Test begins. (1) A hand removes the
dowel of the target object in the center. (2) A hand removes the dowel of the alternative
object A on the left. (3) A hand removes the dowel of the alternative object B on the right.
(4) A hand picks up the target object and places it on the machine. (5) The machine lights
up and play music after the target object is putting on it. (6) The target object is removed
from the machine. Before it displays scene (4), the experimenter says “let’s look at them
again”; scene (1), (2) and (3) are repeated; then the animation moves on to scene (4), (5)
and (6).

Phase 2: Outsides vs. Action
Phase 2 employed the same methodology as Phase 1 but focused on whether
children privilege outsides or action when asked to make inferences about the causal
property of objects. The nine blocks used in Phase 2 were divided into three sets of three
blocks (see Figure 1).
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The target object would be of a certain shape and color (e.g., blue square) and
displayed a certain action (e.g., spinning). The next object (alternative object A) shared
the same outsides as the target (e.g., blue square) but displayed a different motion than
the target object (e.g., jumping). The last object (alternative object B) differed from the
target object in terms of its outsides (e.g., yellow triangle) but displayed the same action
as the target object (e.g., spinning).
Participants were shown each of the objects and the action of each of the objects
(see Figure 3). Specifically, the animation showed a hand selecting each object, with the
experimenter labeling the outsides of the object and the action of the object to the
participant. For example, the experimenter played the animation, and when the hand in
the animation picked up the first object, the experimenter said, “This one is blue and it
spins.” Then the animation showed the participant the second object, and the
experimenter said, “This one jumps and it is blue.” Finally the animation showed the
participant the third object, and the experimenter said, “This one is yellow and it spins.”
The above scene sequence was repeated with the experimenter saying, “Let’s look at
them again.” Next, the animation showed the hand selecting the target object and placing
it on the machine, which caused the machine to light up and play music. Following the
animation, the experimenter said, “Look at that, it makes the machine light up and play
music!” The experimenter then said, “Can you point to another one that can make the
machine light up and play music?” Participants were not given any feedback on their
answers. Once a participant pointed to the object he/she thought could make the machine
light up and play music, the experimenter would then ask the participant, “Why did you
pick that one?” to investigate the reasoning the child offered for his/her choice of a
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particular object (alternative object A or alternative object B). Once the participant
answered the question or stated he/she did not have an answer to the question, the next
trial would start, using three new objects. The procedure continued until the participant
completed the three trials (presented in random order across participants) or indicated
she/he no longer wanted to participate.

Figure 3. This is a sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 2. Each
scene represents a moment in the animation. (0) Test begins. (1) A hand points at the
target object’s action (e.g., spinning). (2) A hand points at the alternative object A’s
action (e.g., jumping) on the left. (3) A hand points at the alternative object B’s action
(e.g., spinning) on the right. (4) A hand picks up the target object and places it on the
machine. (5) The machine lights up and plays music after the target object is put on it. (6)
The target object is removed from the machine. Before it displays scene (4), the
experimenter says “let’s look at them again”; scene (1), (2) and (3) are repeated; then the
animation moves on to scene (4), (5) and (6).

Phase 3: Insides vs. Action
Phase 3 employed the same methodology as Phase 1 but focused on whether
children privilege insides or action when asked to make inferences about the causal
property of objects. The nine blocks used in Phase 3 were divided into three sets of three
blocks (see Figure 4). In each set of three blocks, all of which shared the same shape and
color (e.g. blue square), one object (the target object) had insides (e.g., had a white pin
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inserted into a hole that is then covered by a dowel inserted into the hole, hiding the
contents of the hole) and displayed a certain action (e.g., spinning). The next object
(alternative object A) shared the same insides (e.g., had a white pin inserted into a hole)
but displayed a different motion than the target object (e.g., jumping). The last object
(alternative object B) differed from the target object in terms of its insides (e.g., did not
have a white pin) but displayed the same action as the target object (e.g., spinning).

Figure 4. An example of stimuli from Phase 3. Each row represents a set of objects for a
trial. In each trial, the target object is the object in the center. The two alternative objects
are on both sides. There are two versions (A vs. B) for each set of objects for each trial.
The inside similar alternative object is on the left side of the target object in the A version
of stimuli set. The inside similar alternative object is on the right side of the target object
in the B version of stimuli set. The trials and versions of stimuli in each test phase are
randomly assigned to each participant.
Participants were shown each of the objects and the action of each of the objects
(see Figure 5). Specifically, the animation showed a hand selecting each object and
removing the dowel, with experimenter labeling the inside of the object and the action of
the object to the participants. For example, the experimenter played the animation and
when the hand in the animation picked up the first object, the experimenter said, “This
one has a little white thing inside and it spins.” Then the animation showed the
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participants the second object, and the experimenter said, “This one jumps and it has a
little white thing inside.” Finally the animation showed the participants the third object,
and the experimenter said, “This one is empty and it spins.” After the insides were shown
to the participants, the dowels were put back in place. The above sequence was repeated
with the experimenter saying, “Let’s look at them again.” Next, the animation showed
the hand selecting the target object and placing it on the machine, which caused the
machine to light up and play music. Following the animation, the experimenter said,
“Look at that, it makes the machine light up and play music!” The experimenter then
asked, “Can you point to another one that can make the machine light up and play music?”
Participants were not given any feedback on their answers. Once a participant pointed to
the object he/she thought could make the machine light up and play music, the
experimenter then asked the participants, “Why did you pick that one?” to investigate the
reasoning children offer for their choice of a particular object (alternative object A or
alternative object B). Once the participants answered the question or stated they did not
have an answer to the question, the next trial would start, using three new objects. The
procedure continued until the participants completed the three trials (presented in random
order across participants) or indicated she/he no longer wanted to participate.
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Figure 5. This is a sample scene sequence in a testing trial animation from Phase 3. Each
scene represents a moment in the animation. (0) Test begins. (1) A hand points at the
target object’s action (e.g., spinning). (2) A hand removes the dowel of the target object
in the center. (3) A hand removes the dowel of the alternative object A on the left. (4) A
hand points at the alternative object A’s action (e.g., jumping) on the left. (5) A hand
points at the alternative object B’s action (e.g., spinning) on the right. (6) A hand
removes the dowel of the alternative object B on the right. (7) A hand picks up the target
object and places it on the machine. (8) The machine lights up and plays music after the
target object is put on it. (9) The target object is removed from the machine. Before it
displays scene (4), the experimenter says “let’s look at them again”; scene (1), (2) and (3)
are repeated; then the animation moves on to scenes (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9).

Data collection Training, Quality Control, Data Coding and Prediction
I designed and conducted training sessions for the undergraduate research
assistants (URAs) who were involved in this study. All URAs were blind to the
hypotheses of this study. After extensive training, and performance tests, I assigned the
URAs to the following groups based on their performance, test results and time
availability: recruiting team, testing team, video checking team, data coding and entering
team, data double checking team. I selected a team leader for each team based on the
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individual’s dedication to the research project and his/her prior lab effort and
performance. The team leader’s responsibilities were: 1) coordinate and supervise the
daily frontline work of the URAs’ research activities; 2) collect responses/feedback from
URAs and preschool coordinator and report quickly to me for further action plans; and 3)
implement action plans with their teams accordingly. All participants were videotaped
throughout the procedure for data recording and coding purposes. For the purpose of
protecting participants’ information, only the URAs who were in the testing group and
video checking group had access to the video tapes. These individuals did not have
access to any other data or biographic information (except age, gender and preschool)
regarding the participants.
The URAs in the testing teams were paired, each pair including one tester and one
recorder. The recorder would fill out the answering sheet to record the child’s response.
The URAs in the video checking team would double check the completed answering
sheets based on the video tapes, to make sure child’s answers were correctly recorded.
The team leader of the video checking team would randomly check their work, and upon
finding problems, make corrections. The coding of the video tapes was straightforward.
The URAs in the data coding and entering team were also paired. After the initial coding
and entering of the data, all data was double checked back to back by different paired
URAs. The URAs accurately coded and entered 99% of the responses. The two experts
(team leaders) of the data coding and entering team went through a final check of all the
data. If any questions/disagreements arose, the team leader and I would meet and come to
an agreement to resolve the ambiguity.
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I looked across the three trials to determine the frequency with which each child
chose one of the two alternatives to compute a score of 0 to 3 for each child (0 = never
chooses alternative object A, 1 = chooses alternative object A on 1 of 3 trials, 2 = chooses
alternative object A on 2 of 3 trials, etc.). I then planned to compare the mean frequency
of an object choice between 3 and 5-year-olds to determine if the two age groups differ in
their object choice. I predicted the following results. For Phase 1, I predicted that
significantly more preschoolers would fall into the internal response category (selecting
the internally-similar objects on the majority of trials) than would be expected by chance
in the 5-year-old group but not in the 3-year-old group. For the 3-year-olds, significantly
more preschoolers would fall into the external response category (selecting the
externally-similar object on the majority of trials) than would be expected by chance. For
Phase 2, I predicted that significantly more preschoolers would fall into the
behavior/action response category (selecting the behavioral/action-similar object on the
majority of trials) than would be expected by chance in the 3-year-old group but not in
the 5-year-old group. For the 5-year-olds, preschoolers would not differ from chance in
their choice of a behavioral/action-similar object vs. an externally-similar object. For
Phase 3, I predicted that significantly more preschoolers would fall into the
behavioral/action response category (selecting the behavioral/action-similar object on the
majority of trials) than would be expected by chance in the 3-year-old group but not in
the 5-year-old group. For the 5-year-olds, significantly more preschoolers would fall into
the internal response category (selecting the internally-similar objects on the majority of
trials) than would be expected by chance.
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Results
Preliminary analyses
As a first step in the analyses, I examined whether there was an effect of the order
in which the object sets were presented. Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of order
in either Phase 1 (for 3-year-olds, Kruskal–Wallis test, χ2[5, N = 26] = 3.19, p=.671, ns;
for 5-year-olds, Kruskal–Wallis test, χ2 [5, N = 30] = 4.86, p=.433, ns), Phase 2 (for 3year-olds, Kruskal–Wallis test, χ2[5, N = 31] = 6.92, p = .227, ns; for 5-year-olds,
Kruskal–Wallis test, χ2[5, N = 30] = 2.79, p = .732, ns), or in Phase 3 (for 3-year-olds,
Kruskal–Wallis test, χ2[3, N = 29] = 3.82, p = .148, ns; for 5-year-olds, Kruskal–Wallis
test, χ2 [3, N = 28] = 3.22, p = .200, ns).
Second, I examined whether participants’ responses to the three object sets
differed. Analyses revealed that participants were not more likely to select one alternative
object over another as a function of object set in either Phase 1 (for 3-year-olds,
Cochran’s Q[2] = 1.60, p=.449, ns; for 5-year-olds, Cochran’s Q[2] = 4.20, p=.122, ns),
Phase 2 (for 3-year-olds, Cochran’s Q[2] = 1.08, p=.582, ns; for 5-year-olds, Cochran’s
Q[2] = 2.33, p=.311, ns), or in Phase 3 (for 3-year-olds, Cochran’s Q[2] = 0.00, p = 1.000,
ns; for 5-year-olds, Cochran’s Q[2] = 2.10, p = .350, ns). Therefore, the data of the
participants’ choice pattern from the three trials were combined for subsequent analyses,
to make an overall total score that ranged from zero to 3. These data are shown in Tables
4, 5, and 6, as well as the pattern of choice expected by chance responding.
Third, although I had no specific hypotheses regarding gender differences in
participants’ responses, I conducted a Welch t test, which is robust when two sample
sizes are unequal (Boneau, 1960; Kohr & Games,1974; Posten, 1984; Schmider, Ziegler,
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Danay, Beyer,& Buhner, 2010, Winer, 1971), to investigate any gender differences. No
effect of gender emerged in the sample in either Phase 1 (for 3-year-olds, Welch t [21.33]
= 1.73, p = 0.098, ns; for 5-year-olds, Welch t [20.76] = .51, p = .622, ns), in Phase 2 (for
3-year-olds, Welch t [14.05] =- .75, p = .467, ns; for 5-year-olds, Welch t [27.87] = 1.55,
p = .133, ns), or in Phase 3 (for 3-year-olds, Welch t [19.59] =1 .15, p = .264, ns; for 5year-olds, Welch t [23.58] = 1.82, p = .081, ns). Therefore, participants’ gender was
omitted from further consideration.
Plan for Main Analyses
Two main sets of analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses. The first
analysis set was an independent phase analysis to examine the preschoolers’ choice
patterns at each phase. The second analysis set was an across phase analysis to examine
whether preschoolers’ choice patterns in one phase would fit into their responding in
another phase in the same domain of identity understanding.
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Table 4
Summary of Number of Participants Making Internal Causal Responses Based on
Condition
Number of Internal Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Condition

0

1

2

3

6
(23.1)

6
(23.1)

9
(34.6)

5
(19.2)

3.25

9.75

9.75

3.25

9
(30.0)
3.75

2
(6.7)
11.25

8
(26.7)
11.25

11
(36.7)
3.75

15

8

17

16

(26.8)

(14.3)

(30.3)

(28.6)

7

21

21

7

3
(10.3)
3.63

7
(24.1)
10.88

13
(44.8)
10.88

6
(20.7)
3.63

3
(10.7)

10
(35.7)

10
(35.7)

5
(17.9)

3.50

10.50

10.50

3.50

6

17

23

11

Mean

SD

Phase 1 (External vs.
Internal)
3-year-olds ( N = 26 )
Expected by chance
5-year-olds ( N = 30 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 56)
Expected by chance

1.50

1.068

1.70

1.264

1.61

1.171

1.76

.912

1.61

.916

1.68

.909

Phase 3 (Behavioral/action
vs. Internal)
3-year-olds ( N = 29 )
Expected by chance
5-year-olds ( N = 28 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 57 )

(10.5)
7.13

(29.8) (40.4)
(19.3)
Expected by chance
21.38
21.38
7.13
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
internally-similar object and zero if they chose the non-internally- (externally or
behavioral/action) similar object.
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Table 5
Summary of Number of Participants Making External Causal Responses Based on
Condition
Number of External Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Condition

0

1

2

3

5
(19.2)
3.25

9
(34.6)
9.75

6
(23.1)
9.75

6
(23.1)
3.25

11
(36.7)

8
(26.7)

2
(6.7)

9
(30)

Expected by chance

3.75

11.25

11.25

3.75

Total ( N = 56 )

16

17

8

15

(28.6)

(30.3)

(14.3)

(26.8)

Expected by chance
Phase 2 (Behavioral/action
vs. External)

7

21

21

7

3-year-olds ( N = 31 )

1
(3.2)

11
(35.5)

13
(41.9)

6
(19.4)

Expected by chance

3.88

11.63

11.63

3.88

6
(20.0)

3
(10.0)

15
(50.0)

6
(20.0)

3.75
7

11.25
14

11.25
28

3.75
12

(11.4)

(23.0)

(45.9)

(19.7)

Mean

SD

Phase 1 (Internal vs.
External)
3-year-olds ( N = 26 )
Expected by chance
5-year-olds ( N = 30 )

5-year-olds ( N = 30 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 61 )
Expected by chance

7.62

1.50

1.068

1.30

1.264

1.39

1.171

1.77

.805

1.70

1.022

1.74

.911

22.88
22.88
7.62
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
externally-similar object and zero if they chose the non-externally (internally or
behavioral/action) similar object.
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Table 6
Summary of Number of Participants Making Behavior/Action Causal Responses Based
on Condition
Number of Action Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Condition

0

1

2

3

6
(19.4)
3.88

13
(41.9)
11.63

11
(35.5)
11.63

1
(3.2)
3.88

6
(20.0)

15
(50.0)

3
(10.0)

6
(20.0)

Expected by chance

3.75

11.25

11.25

3.75

Total ( N = 61 )

12

28

14

7

(19.7)

(45.9)

(23.0)

(11.4)

7.62

22.88

22.88

7.62

6
(20.7)

13
(44.8)

7
(24.1)

3
(10.3)

3.63

10.88

10.88

3.63

5
(17.9)

10
(35.7)

10
(35.7)

3
(10.7)

3.50
11

10.50
23

10.50
17

3.50
6

(19.3)

(40.4)

(29.8)

(10.5)

Mean

SD

Phase 2 (Behavioral/action
vs. External)
3-year-olds ( N = 31 )
Expected by chance
5-year-olds ( N = 30 )

Expected by chance
Phase 3 (Internal vs.
Behavioral/action)
3-year-olds ( N = 29 )
Expected by chance
5-year-olds ( N = 28 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 57 )

1.23

.805

1.30

1.022

1.26

.911

1.24

.912

1.39

.916

1.32

.909

Expected by chance
7.13
21.38
21.38
7.13
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
behavioral/action-similar object and zero if they chose the non-behavioral/action(internally or externally) similar object.

Independent Phase Analyses: Insides vs. Outsides (Phase 1)
Descriptive statistics for the sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. The
participants’ task was to choose one of the alternative objects (Object A & Object B) that
they thought could make the machine light up and play music. For each trial, the
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participants were given a score of 1 if they chose the internally-similar object and 0 if
they chose the externally-similar object. Three-year-olds chose the internally-similar
objects on approximately 50% of the trials (M = 1.50, SD = 1.07), whereas 5-year-olds
chose the internally-similar objects on approximately 56.7% of the trials (M = 1.70, SD =
1.26).
The data were compared against chance responding. Because two of the expected
values were below five, I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: internal responses
(selected the internally-similar objects on 2–3 of 3 trials), and external responses
(selected the internally-similar objects on 0–1 of 3 trials). Three-year-olds were internal
responders 54% of the time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding
(50%), binomial tests, p = .845, ns. Five-year-olds were internal responders 63% of the
time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests,
p = .200, ns.
Next, I examined the proportion of preschoolers’ responses that were consistent
over all 3 trials, and compared it against chance responding. I collapsed the data into two
choice patterns: consistent responses (selected the internally-similar objects on 0 or 3 of 3
trials), and inconsistent responses (selected the internally-similar objects on 1 or 2 of 3
trials). Three-year-olds were consistent responders 42% of the time, no more often than
would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .557, ns. Five-yearolds, however, were consistent responders 67% of the time, a marginally trend toward
significant responding more often than would be expected by chance (50%), binomial
tests, p = .09.
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Independent Phase Analysis: Outsides vs. Action (Phase 2)
Descriptive statistics for the sample characteristics are presented in Table 2. The
participants’ task was to choose one of the alternative objects (Object A & Object B) that
they thought could make the machine light up and play music. For each trial, the
participants were given a score of 1 if they chose the externally-similar object and 0 if
they chose the behavioral/action-similar object. Three-year-olds chose the externallysimilar object on approximately 59.1% of the trials (M = 1.77, SD = .805), whereas 5year-olds chose the externally-similar object on approximately 56.7% of the trials (M =
1.70, SD = 1.02).
The data were compared against chance responding. Because two of the expected
values were below five, I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: behavior/action
responses (selected the behavioral/action-similar objects on 2–3 of 3 trials), and external
responses (selected the behavioral/action-similar objects on 0–1 of 3 trials). Three-yearolds were external responders 61% of the time, no more often than would be expected by
chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .281, ns. Five-year-olds were external
responders 70% of the time, significantly more often than would be expected by chance
responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .043.
Next, I examined the proportion of preschoolers’ responses that were consistent
over all 3 trials, and compared it against chance responding. I collapsed the data into two
choice patterns: consistent responses (selected the externally-similar objects on 0 or 3 of
3 trials), and inconsistent responses (selected the externally-similar objects on 1 or 2 of 3
trials). Three-year-olds were consistent responders 23% of the time, significantly less
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often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .003. Fiveyear-olds, in contrast, were consistent responders 40% of the time, no more often than
would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .362, ns.
Independent Phase Analysis: Insides vs. Action (Phase 3)
Descriptive statistics for the sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. The
participants’ task was to choose one of the alternative objects (Object A & Object B) that
they thought could make the machine light up and play music. For each trial, the
participants were given a score of 1 if they chose the internally-similar object and 0 if
they chose the behavioral/action-similar object. Three-year-olds chose the internallysimilar object on approximately 58.6% of the trials (M = 1.76, SD = .91), whereas 5-yearolds chose the internally-similar object on approximately 53.6% of the trials (M = 1.61,
SD = .92).
The data were compared against chance responding. Because two of the expected
values were below 5, I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: internal responses
(selected the internally-similar objects on 2–3 of 3 trials), and behavioral/action responses
(selected the internally-similar objects on 0–1 of 3 trials). Three-year-olds were internal
responders 66% of the time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding
(50%), binomial tests, p = .136, ns. Five-year-olds were internal responders 54% of the
time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests,
p = .851, ns.
Next, I examined the proportion of preschoolers’ responses that were consistent
over all 3 trials, and compared it against chance responding. I collapsed the data into two
choice patterns: consistent responses (selected the internally-similar objects on 0 or 3 of 3
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trials), and inconsistent responses (selected the internally-similar objects on 1 or 2 of 3
trials). Three-year-olds were consistent responders 31% of the time, a trend towards
significantly less often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial
tests, p = .061. Five-year-olds were consistent responders 29% of the time, significantly
less often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p = .036.
Across Phase Analyses
In addition to examining preschoolers’ choice patterns at each phase, I was
interested in looking into whether preschoolers’ choice patterns in one phase would fit
into their response patterns in another phase in the same domain of identity understanding.
In other words, did preschoolers have a general preference across phases with respect to
any particular quality of an object (e.g., internal, external or behavioral/action)? To
investigate this question, I conducted comparisons of participant responding across
phases: 1) internal vs. non-internal (e.g., outsides or behavioral/action) causal conditions
(Phase 1 and Phase 3); 2) external vs. non-external (e.g., insides or behavioral/action)
causal conditions (Phase 1 and Phase 2); and 3) behavioral/action vs. nonbehavioral/action (e.g., insides or outsides) causal conditions (Phase 2 and Phase 3).
Across Phase Analyses: Internal vs. Non-internal Causal Conditions (Phase 1 and
Phase 3)
I combined the data of Phase 1 (insides vs. outsides) and Phase 3 (insides vs.
behavioral/action) because the two alternatives for both phases are internal vs. noninternal quality. Specifically, for each trial, the participants were given a score of 1 if they
chose the internally-similar object and 0 if they chose the non-internal (external
behavioral/action) similar object. Summaries of preschoolers making internal causal
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responses are presented in Table 7 (based on age). Three-year-olds chose the internallysimilar objects on approximately 54.55% of the trials (M = 1.64, SD = .988), whereas 5year-olds chose the internally-similar objects on approximately 55.17% of the trials in the
internal vs. non-internal domain (M = 1.66, SD = 1.101).
The combined data of Phase 1 and Phase 3 were compared against chance
responding. I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: internal responses (selected the
internally-similar objects on 2–3 of 3 trials), and non-internal responses (selected the
internally-similar objects on 0–1 of 3 trials). Three-year-olds were internal responders
60.0% of the time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%),
binomial tests, p = .177, ns. Five-year-olds were internal responders 58.9% of the time,
no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p
= .237, ns.
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Table 7
Summary of Number of Participants Making Internal Causal Responses Based on Age
Number of Internal Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Age

0

1

2

6
(23.1)

6
(23.1)

9
(34.6)

5
(19.2)

3.25

9.75

9.75

3.25

3
(10.3)

7
(24.1)

13
(44.8)

6
(20.7)

3.63

10.88

10.88

3.63

9

13

22

11

(16.4)
6.88

(23.6)
20.63

(40.0)
20.63

(20.0)
6.88

9
(30.0)

2
(6.7)

8
(26.7)

11
(36.7)

3.63

10.88

10.88

3.63

3
(10.7)

10
(35.7)

10
(35.7)

5
(17.9)

Expected by chance

3.50

10.50

10.50

3.50

Total ( N = 58 )

12

12

18

16

(20.7)

(20.7)

(31.0)

(27.6)

3-year-olds
Phase 1 (N = 26)
Expected by chance
Phase 3 ( N = 29 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 55)
Expected by chance

3

Mean

SD

1.50

1.068

1.76

.912

1.64

.988

1.70

1.264

1.61

.916

1.66

1.101

5-year-olds
Phase 1 ( N = 30 )
Expected by chance
Phase 3 ( N = 28 )

Expected by chance
7.25
21.75
21.75
7.25
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
internally-similar object and zero if they chose the non-internally- (externally or
behavioral/action) similar object.

Across Phase Analyses: External vs. Non-external Causal Conditions (Phase 1 and
Phase 2)
I combined the data of Phase 1 (inside vs. outside) and Phase 2 (outside vs.
behavioral/action) because the two alternatives for both phases are external vs. non-
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external quality. Specifically, for each trial, the participants were given a score of 1 if
they chose the external similar object and 0 if they chose the non-external (internal or
behavioral/action) similar object. Summaries of preschoolers making external causal
responses are presented in Table 8 (based on age). Three-year-olds chose the externallysimilar objects on approximately 55.0% of the trials (M = 1.65, SD = .935), whereas 5year-olds chose the externally-similar objects on approximately 50.0% of the trials in the
external vs. non-external domain (M = 1.50, SD =1.157).
The combined data of Phase 1 and Phase 2 were compared against chance
responding. I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: external responses (selected the
externally-similar object on 2–3 of 3 trials), and non-external responses (selected the
externally-similar object on 0–1 of 3 trials). Three-year-olds were external responders
54.4% of the time, no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%),
binomial tests, p = .597, ns. Five-year-olds were external responders 53.3% of the time,
no more often than would be expected by chance responding (50%), binomial tests, p
= .699, ns.
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Table 8
Summary of Number of Participants Making External Causal Responses Based on Age
Number of External Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Condition

0

1

2

5
(19.2)

9
(34.6)

6
(23.1)

6
(23.1)

Expected by chance

3.25

9.75

9.75

3.25

Phase 2 ( N = 31 )

1
(3.2)

11
(35.5)

13
(41.9)

6
(19.4)

Expected by chance

3.88

11.63

11.63

3.88

6
(10.5)

20
(35.1)

19
(33.3)

12
(21.1)

Expected by chance
5-year-olds

7.13

21.38

21.38

7.13

Phase 1 ( N = 30 )

11
(36.7)

8
(26.7)

2
(6.7)

9
(30.0)

Expected by chance

3.75

11.25

11.25

3.75

Phase 2 ( N = 30 )

6
(20.0)

3
(10.0)

15
(50.0)

6
(20.0)

Expected by chance
Total ( N = 60 )

3.75
17
(28.3)

11.25
11
(18.3)

11.25
17
(28.3)

3.75
15
(25.0)

3-year-olds
Phase 1 ( N = 26 )

Total ( N = 57 )

3

Mean

SD

1.50

1.068

1.77

.805

1.65

.935

1.30

1.264

1.70

1.022

1.50

1.157

Expected by chance
7.13
21.38
21.38
7.13
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
externally-similar object and zero if they chose the non-externally- (internally or
behavioral/action) similar object.

Across Phase Analyses: Behavioral/action vs. Non-Behavioral/action Causal
Conditions (Phase 2 and Phase 3)
I combined the data of Phase 2 (outside vs. behavioral/action) and Phase 3 (inside
vs. behavioral/action) because the two alternatives for both phases are behavioral/action
vs. non-behavioral/action quality. Specifically, for each trial, the participants were given
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a score of 1 if they chose the behavioral/action-similar object and 0 if they chose the nonbehavioral/action (inside or outside) similar object. Summaries of preschoolers making
behavioral/action causal responses are presented in Table 8 (based on age). Three-yearolds chose the behavioral/action-similar objects on approximately 33.3% of the trials (M
= 1.23, SD = .851), whereas 5-year-olds chose the behavioral/action-similar objects on
approximately 44.8% of the trials in the behavioral/action vs. non-behavioral/action
domain (M = 1.34, SD =.965).
The combined data of Phase 2 and Phase 3 were compared against chance
responding. I collapsed the data into two choice patterns: behavioral/action responses
(selected the behavioral/action-similar object on 2–3 of 3 trials), and nonbehavioral/action responses (selected the behavioral/action-similar object on 0–1 of 3
trials). Three-year-olds were behavioral/action responders 36.7% of the time, a trend
toward significantly less often than would be expected by chance responding (50%),
binomial tests, p = .052. Five-year-olds were behavioral/action responders 37.9% of the
time, a marginally trend toward significant responding less often than would be expected
by chance (50%), binomial tests, p = .087.
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Table 9
Summary of Number of Participants Making Behavior/Action Causal Responses Based
on Age
Number of Behavioral/action
Reponses
Out of 3 Trials (% of N)
Condition

0

1

2

3

6
(19.4)
3.88

13
(41.9)
11.63

11
(35.5)
11.63

1
(3.2)
3.88

6
(20.7)

13
(44.8)

7
(24.1)

3
(10.3)

3.63

10.88

10.88

3.63

12
(20.0)

26
(43.3)

18
(30.0)

4
(6.7)

7.50

22.50

22.50

7.50

6
(20.0)

15
(50.0)

3
(10.0)

6
(20.0)

3.75

11.25

11.25

3.75

5
(17.9)

10
(35.7)

10
(35.7)

3
(10.7)

3.50

10.50

10.50

3.50

Mean

SD

3-year-olds
Phase 2 ( N = 31 )
Expected by chance
Phase 3 ( N = 29 )
Expected by chance
Total ( N = 60)
Expected by chance
5-year-olds
Phase 2 ( N = 30 )
Expected by chance
Phase 3 ( N = 28 )
Expected by chance

1.23

.805

1.24

.912

1.23

.851

1.30

1.022

1.39

.916

Total ( N = 58)

11
25
13
9
1.34
.965
(19.0) (43.1) (22.4)
(15.5)
Expected by chance
7.25
21.75
21.75
7.25
Note. Coding: For each trial, the preschoolers were given a score of one if they chose the
behavioral/action-similar object and zero if they chose the non-behavioral/action(internally or externally) similar object.

Discussion
The main aim of this study ventured to enrich previous work, investigating the
extent to which young preschoolers (e.g., 3-year-olds) understand identity in terms of
what an object does rather than in terms of either what the object looks like or what its
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inside properties are. To investigate this issue I have taken Sobel et al.’s (2007) paradigm
and modified it to include diverse pairs (e.g., insides, outsides, behavior/action) in order
to explore different levels/qualities of organization that characterize preschoolers’
judgments of identity constancy. I suggested that a transition may occur between the ages
of 3- and 5-years-old: a shift from a focus on behavior/action to a focus on insides as
foundational to identity judgments.
Results of this study revealed that: First, there was no evidence in 5-year-olds of a
consistent tendency toward aligning identity with insides or outsides, the same occurred
in 3-year-olds, and it appeared that their responses did not significantly differ from
chance; Second, with respect to behavior/action, as opposed to my prediction,
preschoolers (both 3- and 5-year-olds) preferred either insides or outsides over
behavior/action. Also, significantly more 5-year-olds chose outsides over behavior/action
when the two were compared; and across the phases, when behavior/action was
compared with non-behavior/action, non-behavior/action was overwhelmingly preferred
by both 3- and 5-year-olds. In other words, preschoolers did not seem to consider
behavior/action as central to identity in the context of this causal paradigm.
More specifically, with respect to my first prediction in Phase 1, I predicted that
significantly more preschoolers would fall into the internal response category (selecting
the internally-similar objects on the majority of trials) than would be expected by chance
in the 5-year-old group but not in the 3-year-old group. For the 3-year-olds, significantly
more preschoolers would fall into the external response category (selecting the
externally-similar object on the majority of trials) than would be expected by chance.
However, I found no support for this prediction and the result of this phase was not
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consistent with the findings reported in Sobel et al (2007). Why does this study not
replicate Sobel et al.? Does the failure to replicate reflected on the fact that Sobel’s study
is not replicable, or are there other possibilities than were indicated by Sobel’s illustration
of what takes place at 3 and 4 years of age? Or does the failure to replicate reflect a
function of that my attempt to replicate differed from his study? The following
paragraphs explain how this study differed from Sobel et al.
First, it differed in terms of sampling trials. In the current study, I used 3 instead
of 4 trials. This minor dissimilarity is not significant or meaningful enough to make a real
difference. This study offered enough trials to measure consistency in a child’s
responding. Additionally, it captured the tendency of 3-and 5-year-olds showing
significant bias against behavior/action. Future study should investigate on these two
different approaches by directly comparing and contrasting them (3 trials vs. 4 trials) in
order to determine whether one fewer trial is of consequence. If a study does not replicate
using the approach in Sobel et al.(2007) with one fewer trial, it is possible that the
phenomenon Sobel et al. found is unstable.
Second, it differed in terms of research stimuli. This study deployed testing with
animation instead of real life presentation. It is possible that this differentiation makes
this study even more standardized. It enabled the researcher to limit uncontrollable
factors and mistakes to the lowest level during testing phases. With video clip
presentations, preschoolers have a direct visual experience of learning various qualities
that represent objects to help with their identity judgments. This study seems to
demonstrate a unique and positive approach. However, there is a possibility that the
presence of animation could have a negative impact on younger preschoolers’ ability to
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concentrate on the information provided by the experimenter. To that effect, this second
difference would play a role. It is possible that the preschoolers’ visual experience of
animation in this study versus Sobel et al. (2007) participants’ visual experience of 3dimensional objects may be a contributor to the incongruence in findings. Future research
will be required to examine which patterns (i.e., the assertion of Sobel et al. that 3-yearolds are externalists, and 4-year-olds are essentialists; vs. no distinct essentialist tendency
emerging in the 5-year -olds and no distinct externalist tendency emerging in the 3-yearolds) are more legitimate as a representation of preschoolers’ identity judgments. As a
suggestion, one direct way is to compare and contrast these two different approaches (real
life presentation vs. animation). For instance, researchers could apply the real life
presentation approach to half of the participants, and apply the animation approach to the
other half of the participants with an equal number of trials in order to see whether the
method make any difference.
Third, it differed in terms of ethnicity, socioeconomic status (SES), and parent
education level diversity. In terms of ethnicity, the distribution in this study is diversely
distributed (54% are Caucasian), whereas a greater proportion of the distribution in Sobel
et al (2007) is Caucasian (75%). In order to examine whether ethnicity plays a role, I reexamined the data of this study by reducing the sample size to only include Caucasian
children, and compared their responses against chance. The result revealed that, after the
sample size reduction, the proportion of the 5-year-olds who fall into internal responder
category remained the same as before. Thus, ethnicity diversity is not a factor. Next I
examined whether SES plays a role by reducing the sample size to include only
preschoolers parent education levels are college and above. The result revealed that 71%
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(17 out of 24) of the 5-year-olds fall into the internal responder category, more than
would be expected by chance (p=.064). Hence, it is possible that SES diversity is a factor.
I then conducted similar sample size reductions to include only preschoolers from an
upper-middle level income family (equal to or more than $50,000 annually). The results
revealed that 74% (14 out of 19) of the 5-year-olds fall into the internal responder
category, more than would be expected by chance (p=.064). So it is possible that the
diversity of parent education level is a factor. Future research on diversity of SES and
parent education level in relation to preschoolers identity judgments is needed, as Sobel
et al. did not include any information in related to these two factors.
Disparity between 5-year-olds’ response pattern in the narrow sample versus the
sample as a whole raises a question: why would preschoolers from higher SES
backgrounds and whose parents have higher education show a greater tendency to exhibit
essentialist thought compared to my sample as a whole? It is possible that this disparity
has something to do with language differences between the narrow sample and the
sample as a whole. Preschoolers at the lower end of the SES spectrum and lower parental
education levels may not experience the same kind of enriched language environment as
preschoolers from higher SES and parental education levels. Gelman (2003) has
acknowledged that language might have an influence on essentialist thoughts but argues
that the emergence of essentialist thought is more likely to precede language development
than to follow from it.
However, in the Theory of Mind (ToM) literature, language environment seems to
be critical to the acquisition of a theory of mind (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla &
Youngblade, 1991; Mar, Tackett & Moore, 2010; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007).
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Parents, for example, who spend more time talking with their children about
psychological states (e.g., emotions, feelings, and thoughts) have children who
demonstrate more advanced ToM skills. Additionally, maternal psychological talk
predicts children’s ToM understanding (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Thus, how
parents talk with their children about internal states matters to their children’s cognitive
development. Given this, it makes sense that increased exposure to talk about internal
states may also help children to develop more of an essentialist frame of mind. It is
possible that this is, in fact, what accounts for my findings. Future research needs to
examine the contribution of language to preschoolers’ causal identity judgments.
For Phase 1, even though 5-year-olds did not show any inclination to choose
either insides or outsides, they showed a statistical trend of falling into the consistent
responder category. In other words, a majority of the 5-year-olds were consistent
responders when contrasting insides vs. outsides. When I examined these consistent
responders, their responding did not favor one direction. Eleven out of 20 chose insides,
and 9 out of 20 chose outsides. Because 5-year-olds were more consistent in their
responding, they seem to have achieved more stability when compared to 3-year-olds.
With respect to my first prediction in Phase 2, I predicted that significantly more
preschoolers would fall into the behavior/action response category (selecting the
behavioral/action-similar object on the majority of trials) than would be expected by
chance in the 3-year-old group. For the 5-year-olds, preschoolers would not differ from
chance in their choice of a behavioral/action-similar object vs. an externally-similar
object. For Phase 3, I predicted that significantly more preschoolers would fall into the
behavioral/action response category (selecting the behavioral/action-similar object on the
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majority of trials) than would be expected by chance in the 3-year-old group. For the 5year-olds, significantly more preschoolers would fall into the internal response category
(selecting the internally-similar objects on the majority of trials) than would be expected
by chance. Distinguished from my prediction for Phases 2 and 3, preschoolers showed
bias against behavior/action in their identity judgments. To both 3-and 5-year-olds,
behavior/action does not seem to matter when making identity judgments. The findings in
Phases 2 and 3 raised a question: why does this study not show preschoolers favoring
behavior/action as some previous studies have shown (e.g., Mohr, 1978; Nicolopoulou &
Richner, 2007; Shipley, 2000)?
One possible explanation is that even though this study is about identity, it is
about a specific function of identity: how identity relates to causality (e.g., what is it
about this object that activates the machine?). More specifically, I examined how the
property of identity relates to causal aspects of the world, or, how it might cause changes
in other things. By this account, the current study is a causal paradigm, whereas the other
studies were not causal paradigms, instead, they focus on the nature of identity, which
does not equate to the causal aspect of identity. Additionally, the other studies suggested
that children think behavior/action is important for identifying what something is, and
they think that what something is depends on what it does (behavior/action). But in this
current paradigm, I asked what about this object (i.e., the property of the object) causes
the machine to light up and play music. That is a little different than asking what is the
nature of the object, even though we may expect that behavior/action would be of
relevance. Hence, this paradigm is about a very specific consequence of identity, whereas
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the other studies were about the nature of identity itself. But still, they are all identity
paradigms that map onto the general understanding of identity.
Moreover, when children start to become essentialist, they think our insides make
us who we are, and thus controls our behavior/action (Gelman, 2000, 2003; Gelman &
Wellman, 1991; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Keil, 1989; Newman & Keil, 2008; Simons
& Keil, 1995). Simply understanding that our insides make us who we are is different
than understanding our insides have a causal impact on what we do and to what degree
we understand the consequence of our behavior/action. Those are two different realms of
identity paradigm. These potential differences might explain the apparent inconsistency
between the finding of this study and previous ones, even though they are studies in
relation to identity. Overall, there is solid evidence in this study supporting the idea that
behavior does not constitute an important critical factor for preschoolers in a causal
paradigm.
Results of this study shed new light on our understanding of developmental
patterns between ages 3 and 5. I found alternative developmental pathways with regards
to consistency in preschoolers responding. At age 5, preschoolers showed consistency in
their responding, however, their responding did not favor one direction. In other words,
neither did they all consistently hold essentialist thoughts or consistently hold externalist
thoughts. Nearly half of them showed essentialist bias, and half of them showed
externalist bias, whereas Sobel et al. (2007) suggested consistency at ages of 4 and 5 (i.e.,
preschoolers were consistently essentialists at ages 4 and5). The 5-year-olds showed
more individual variability in their consistence (e.g., there seems to be stability within
participants in their responses, but more variability between participants). Age 3,
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preschoolers did not show consistency in their responding, and their responses were
inconclusive. Given my results, it is possible that younger preschoolers are still in a
transition period, and their organizational structure in identity judgments is potentially
fragile, unlike what Sobel et al (2007) suggested, consistency at age 3 (i.e., preschoolers
were consistently externalists at age 3).
Overall, there was more variability within participants at 3 years; and at 5 years,
there seems to be more stability within participants in their responding, but more
variability between participants when contrasting insides with outsides. Additionally,
there was more variability within participants at 3- and 5-years when contrasting
behavioral/action with insides or outsides. These findings suggest that younger (e.g., 3year-olds) preschoolers’ thoughts are in flux, suggesting the possibility that younger
preschoolers are in a developmentally transitional period.
Limitations and Future Directions
It is important to recognize that a number of limitations of this study could be
addressed in future research. First, although this study involved the investigation and
examination of ideas/findings reported in Sobel et al. (2007), I must emphasize that I
used different research stimuli, different numbers of sampling trials and sample sizes, and
my statistical analyses differed from those implemented in previous research. Therefore,
any comparison of the current results with previous findings should be treated with
caution. Additional research is still required to examine which developmental patterns are
more legitimate as a representation of preschooler identity judgments. Researchers are
encouraged to directly compare and contrast the two different approaches (real life
presentation vs. animation; 3 trials vs. 4 trials).
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The second limitation is the diversity of the samples. This study included nearly
180 preschoolers in over 10 preschools from Albuquerque, NM from a variety of
educational backgrounds and socioeconomic statuses. This is not a homogenous sample
when compared to Sobel et al.(2007) , which introduced more variability in the sample
and complicated results. As the findings of this study suggested, parent education level
and SES seem play a role. A suitable larger sample size is required for future research in
order to wash out the variability in the sample. Or researcher should implement
systematical control to that variability by having an equal number of participants in
different parent education or SES groups. Sobel et al’s study, in its original methodology,
needs to be replicated with more economically and educationally diverse samples in order
to gain a deeper understanding of how these two factors influences the development of
identity judgments in preschoolers.
Lastly, this study involved many experimenters in order to complete three phases
which involved a great number of preschoolers throughout a period of over one and a half
academic years. All of the experimenters were pre-tested, well trained and each
participant’s testing session utilized prescribed, standardized transcripts for the purpose
of continuity and consistency. However, the more experimenters we involved, the more
uncontrollable the factors, which naturally introduced more variability into the study,
which may have affected outcome.
Future work need to examine how systematically this study (i.e., a causal
paradigm) is related to other identity judgment studies (i.e., adoption paradigm,
transformation/transplant paradigm) by studying the same child’s responses to these
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different paradigms to see if there is consistency in his/her responding across these
paradigms.
Conclusion
Decades of research have revealed a great deal about young preschoolers’
understanding of identity in terms of either what the object looks like (external quality)
or what its inside properties are (internal quality), but not much in terms of what an
object does (behavioral/action quality). In the paradigm introduced in this study, I
explored how three organizational qualities (internal, external, and behavioral/action
features) contribute to preschoolers’ identity judgments. Findings suggest that
preschoolers do not seem to grant behavior/action any causal power when determining
object identity. Failing to replicate Sobel et al. (2007), it is possible that the phenomenon
they found in their study was legitimate but highly fragile, or perhaps I did not replicate
Sobel et al. because younger preschoolers’ thoughts are in flux. Five-year-olds show
consistency in their responding, but this consistency is not in one direction (e.g.,
essentialist thoughts) as Sobel et al. suggests. Further research is needed to investigate
which developmental patterns are more legitimate as a representation of preschoolers’
identity judgments. Sobel et al’s study, in its original methodology, is encouraged to be
replicated with more economically and educationally diverse samples in order to gain a
deeper understanding of how these two factors influences the development of identity
judgments in preschoolers.
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